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Provable Time and Place of Capture for Photos
ABSTRACT
Photographs can be manipulated or decontextualized to mislead or misrepresent. Existing
techniques to authenticate the time or location of image capture, such as stamping a time on the
image, are rather simplistic and vulnerable. This disclosure describes techniques to prove the
time and place of capture of a photograph. An authenticity server generates a timestamped,
pseudorandom pattern. Upon capture of a photograph, the camera downloads the pattern and
captures an authentication video while executing a sequence of movements corresponding to the
pattern. The authentication video can be used to authenticate the time of capture of the
photograph by confirming that the camera moved in accordance with the timestamped,
pseudorandom pattern.
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BACKGROUND
It is not too difficult to manipulate or decontextualize an image to mislead or
misrepresent [1]. Such manipulations can damage reputation, public opinion, etc. Existing
techniques to pinpoint the time or location of image capture, such as stamping a time on the
image [2], are rather simplistic and vulnerable. Some processes [3] amount to collecting
additional information in the photographer’s hopes of certifying authenticity. However, image
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authenticity ought to be provable regardless of the photographer's interest in doing so; indeed,
provability can be more important when the photographer is suspected of falsification.
A photo can be proven to have been taken before a certain time; for example, it was
certainly taken before a viewer viewed it. It was also taken before the time it was uploaded (to a
social-media, news, photo-sharing, or other site). It is also possible to use blockchain technology
to prove that a photo was taken before a certain time [4].
Proving that photo was taken strictly after a particular time is trickier. A classic technique
is to include a newspaper in the photo; the photo is then proven to be younger than the date of
publication of the newspaper. A more modern version might be to include in the photo a
smartphone with a newsfeed. The classic technique is not beyond manipulation; it is also
inconvenient and impractical: the photographer has to expend effort to include in the original
image an item (such as a newspaper) that proves its date. Spontaneous or candid photographs are
not amenable to this technique.
DESCRIPTION
This disclosure describes techniques to prove the time and place of capture of a
photograph. The techniques require no hardware other than that of a typical smartphone, nor do
they rely on any trusted entity or expert to certify an image.
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Proving time of image capture

Fig. 1: Proving time of capture of an image
Fig. 1 illustrates proving the time of capture of an image. An authenticity server (102)
generates a timestamped, pseudorandom pattern (108). The pattern changes with time, and the
frequency of its change can vary with the granularity with which the image is to be pinpointed in
time. For example, the pseudorandom pattern can change once an hour, once a day, etc. A user
with a camera (104) captures a photo (110). The photo and its metadata (EXIF) are hashed, e.g.,
labeled using a checksum operation, and the hash is uploaded to the authenticity server (112).
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As illustrated in Fig. 2, the receipt of the hash by the authenticity server establishes a time
T1 before which the photo was taken. The camera receives from the authenticity server the
timestamped, pseudorandom pattern (114). The receipt of the pattern timestamped at T2
establishes a time after which the photo was taken. The pattern is uncontrollable by and a priori
unknown to the user.
At a time after receiving the pattern, the user captures an authentication video while
moving the camera in accordance with the received pattern (116). For example, if the
pseudorandom pattern was N-SW-E-NW-Up, then the user captures the video while sequentially
pointing North, South-West, East, North-West, and up. The user can be guided in the camera
movement by an augmented reality app that provides movement instructions in an easy and
natural way.
The camera optionally transmits the photo, its hash, and its authentication video
(compressed as necessary) to the authenticity server (118). The authenticity server authenticates
the timestamp of the photo (120) by verifying that the turns taken by the camera (movement of
the camera) during the capture of the authenticating video accord with the timestamped,
pseudorandom pattern. Verifying the turns within the authenticating video can be done using a
machine learning model. For example, if all the objects in a video move to the right, then the
camera was panned to the left. Also, it can be a requirement that objects in the photo appear at
corresponding times and positions in the video, e.g., the video must be a continuation of the
photo. One who wishes to falsify the photo, e.g., by adding or removing an object in the photo,
must also do so in the video, which is a substantially more difficult task.
The photo is shared, e.g., with a peer or via an image-sharing site (122) or other service.
A viewer (106) of the image wishes to determine the authentic timestamp of the photo, and
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queries the authenticity server (124) with a hash of the photo. Based on the concordance of the
authentication video with the timestamped pseudorandom pattern it issued, the authenticity
server has already established the authenticity of the timestamp of the photo corresponding to the
hash. The authenticity server responds appropriately to the query (126).

Fig. 2: Windowing the photograph between T1 and T2
Alternatively, upon receiving an authenticating query from a viewer, the authenticity
server can release to the viewer the authentication video and the pseudorandom pattern at the
time of image capture, enabling the viewer to determine the authentic timestamp of the image. If
the photo and the authentication video haven’t been uploaded to the authenticity server, the
photographer can release to the viewer the authentication video and, by downloading the
pseudorandom sequence from the authenticity server at the claimed time of capture, the viewer
can determine the authenticity of the timestamp of the image.
The pseudorandom pattern can be a combination of camera tilt (up/down: 1 bit) and one
of the eight compass directions (3 bits). The pattern can incorporate movements of greater
precision with temporal variability, e.g., make a short stop in the third position in the pattern
while moving smoothly from the fifth to the sixth position.
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Fig. 3: Illustrating the number of movement possibilities for the authenticating video
Fig. 3 illustrates an example matrix for the number of possible movement targets for the
camera position during the take of the authenticating video. The user starts in the middle
immediately after the photo is taken and follows the received pattern through three points in the
circular matrix selected randomly, either stopping at them or not. This produces approximately
(23 × 2)3 = 97,336 possible patterns, representable by about 16 bits. The probability of ending up
with a correct pattern by just a coincidence is very low - 1÷97,336 ~ 0.001%.
The described techniques of timestamp authentication are generally applicable, e.g., for
journalists taking photographs for public consumption, for a tenant documenting the state of an
apartment just before accepting the keys, or for anyone else taking a photo of any significance.
While smartphone cameras need no additional components to implement the described
techniques, standalone cameras can either have their firmware updated to support the described
techniques or be accompanied by a special-purpose device.
If the hash of the photo and its authentication video are the only data uploaded to the
authenticity server (rather than the actual photo and its authentication video), the amount of data
exchanged is very small, perhaps a few bytes, comparable to the size of an SMS message. Such
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data exchange can be completed even when the device is roaming or under poor network
conditions. The publicly accessible aspects of the techniques, e.g., the authenticity server, are
computationally inexpensive (since these are utilized only to generate pseudorandom patterns
and authenticate submitted photos using well-known cryptographic techniques) and have low
storage requirements (since these store only hashes). Raw images and videos can be stored
elsewhere (e.g., on the capturing device, at an image-sharing or social media website, etc.) and
retrieved for the purposes of verification. Alternative to the use of a machine learning model to
verify that the camera movement follows a given pattern, expert humans can also do so
manually.
In this manner, demanding continuity of the photo in the video narrows the window of
time of capture to minutes (or less, depending on the frequency of pattern generation). Obtaining
a photo and near-simultaneously a video with specified camera movements makes image
manipulation much harder.
Proving place of image capture

Fig. 4: Pinpointing a location of image capture [5]
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As described in [5], an approach to proving the location of image capture is to have the
camera accurately measure ping delays to one or more beacon stations, e.g., cell-phone towers.
In practice, such a scheme requires that the computations and the beacon-camera interactions be
completed in an unfeasibly tight window, e.g., microseconds. Also a problem with this approach
is that image origin can be forged by having a proxy device in the target area, e.g., the VPN exit
point. The techniques described herein harden the scheme of [5] by enabling the camera to
include in the reply a random subset of pixels from the raw image. This dovetails nicely with
recording a short authentication video after the capture of the image.
Modes of attack
While a determined photograph falsifier can, in theory, bypass the provable timestamp
mechanism herein described, doing so is expensive and laborious. Falsifying T1, the time before
which the photo was captured, entails the control of data storage, a task rendered very difficult
by existing distributed database protocols. Falsifying T2, the time after which the photo was
captured, can be attempted in the following ways:
● The falsifier can try to control the pattern. This can be thwarted by making pattern
generation open and verifiable (for which there are multiple ways), e.g., a given received
pattern can be verified as being issued by the authenticity server.
● The falsifier can try to predict the pattern, or wait until a specific pattern appears
and publish a previously-taken photo at that time. Such an attempt at falsification is
very time-consuming. For example, if the pattern is updated every 5 minutes and if there
are 105 possible patterns, then a particular pattern repeats once every 105×5 minutes ≈
347 days. Additional factors such as visible weather conditions or time of the day in a
photo make it even harder to attribute the photo to a particular date. Entangling the seed
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with the image hash, e.g., by asking users to present a photo hash before giving a pattern
(rather than simply broadcasting the pattern), makes brute force attempts visible.
● The falsifier can try to capture photos in a way that enables them to post facto
generate the required proof. For example, the falsifier can capture footage with
multiple cameras from multiple possible angles, and stitch together the authentication
video just after the pattern appears. While theoretically possible, such a technique is very
expensive and substantially raises the bar for convincing forgery.
Further to the descriptions above, a user may be provided with controls allowing the user
to make an election as to both if and when systems, programs or features described herein may
enable collection of user information (e.g., information about a user’s captured photos/videos, a
user’s preferences, or a user’s current location), and if the user is sent content or communications
from a server. In addition, certain data may be treated in one or more ways before it is stored or
used, so that personally identifiable information is removed. For example, a user’s identity may
be treated so that no personally identifiable information can be determined for the user, or a
user’s geographic location may be generalized where location information is obtained (such as to
a city, ZIP code, or state level), so that a particular location of a user cannot be determined. Thus,
the user may have control over what information is collected about the user, how that
information is used, and what information is provided to the user.
CONCLUSION
This disclosure describes techniques to prove the time and place of capture of a
photograph. An authenticity server generates a timestamped, pseudorandom pattern. Upon
capture of a photograph, the camera downloads the pattern and captures an authentication video
while executing a sequence of movements corresponding to the pattern. The authentication video
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can be used to authenticate the time of capture of the photograph by confirming that the camera
moved in accordance with the timestamped, pseudorandom pattern.
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